Modi's China Pivot Sparks Concern in U.S. Ag Sector
India edges closer to China as U.S. trade tensions rise-what it means for American agriculture and global supply chains.
In a surprising geopolitical turn, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to visit China for the first time since 2018 to attend a summit hosted by President Xi Jinping, signaling a potential recalibration of India's foreign policy. The visit follows the Trump administration's recent decision to impose 50% tariffs on Indian imports, punishing India for maintaining energy ties with Russia amid global pressure. This move has pushed India to pursue a pragmatic thaw in relations with Beijing-just five years after their troops engaged in a deadly clash at the Himalayan border.
The diplomatic shift has caused significant unease in the U.S. agricultural sector, where India is considered a key strategic market. In 2024, U.S. agricultural exports to India exceeded $2.5 billion, led by almonds, pistachios, cotton, and ethanol. India is the top export market for U.S. tree nuts and a critical consumer of American feed grains and edible oils. Any deterioration in trade relations-or realignment of India's import sources toward China-could have far-reaching implications for commodity prices, export volume, and ag supply chains.
At the heart of this shift is India's historical policy of strategic autonomy, which prioritizes national interests over ideological alliances. While the U.S. has been working for years to strengthen bilateral ties with India through technology transfers, joint military drills, and agricultural partnerships, recent tariff actions are forcing New Delhi to reconsider its diplomatic calculus. India's participation in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit is a striking signal that its foreign engagement strategy is evolving-with direct implications for U.S. economic interests.
Agricultural players in the U.S. have reason to be wary. India has reportedly offered tariff reductions on U.S. agricultural goods such as almonds, pistachios, walnuts, and blueberries, in hopes of salvaging its trade relationship with Washington. However, India continues to shield its domestic markets for dairy, wheat, rice, and GM crops, areas that remain off-limits in ongoing negotiations. These barriers have long limited the full potential of U.S.-India agricultural trade, and the current geopolitical shift adds further complexity to an already cautious relationship.
At the same time, India is turning to Chinese agri-inputs and technologies, including intermediate goods, fertilizers, and precision agriculture equipment, creating a pipeline of economic cooperation that could divert future investment away from U.S. suppliers. With bilateral India-China trade exceeding $118 billion in 2024, the economic rationale for India's eastward tilt is clear, even if security mistrust between the two nations remains unresolved.
In the midst of tariff tensions, the U.S. cotton industry has already seen dramatic fluctuations. Between February and April 2025, U.S. upland cotton exports to India surged to a 2.5-year high, driven by falling prices and robust Indian demand. Yet this short-term windfall masks longer-term uncertainty: if India secures more favorable import terms with Chinese textile partners or increases domestic production subsidies, U.S. cotton growers could face renewed export challenges.
Meanwhile, the broader risk for U.S. agriculture is that India may align itself more closely with China in global regulatory and trade standard forums. This could shift agricultural norms, import restrictions, and supply chain preferences toward non-Western systems, making it harder for U.S. ag exporters to maintain their market position. For American co-ops, grain traders, and commodity boards, such a realignment would increase pressure to diversify markets, navigate more complex regulatory environments, and manage rising export volatility.
Despite this, New Delhi has not fully pivoted away from Washington. India remains deeply invested in the Quad alliance with the U.S., Japan, and Australia-seen as a democratic counterbalance to Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. But India's recalibration reflects a growing recognition that its future economic resilience depends on engaging multiple power centers, particularly when strategic partnerships are tested by punitive trade policies and diplomatic missteps.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets with visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in New Delhi, India on August 19, 2025.
On the ground, the symbolism of Modi and Xi potentially shaking hands-despite past border hostilities-carries significant weight. Their nations are still militarily entrenched along a disputed boundary, with tens of thousands of troops deployed. But behind the military standoff lies a mutual recognition that economic interdependence is indispensable. Recent agreements to resume direct flights, reissue tourist visas, and reopen religious sites suggest a broader effort to stabilize ties without abandoning their respective geopolitical goals.
For U.S. ag stakeholders, this moment marks a critical juncture. While India has historically been one of the few large developing economies open to Western agri-tech and biotech collaboration, a more China-friendly India may reverse that openness. American producers must now monitor not only tariff announcements but also diplomatic signals, trade alignments, and regional bloc activity that may determine the next decade of export growth-or stagnation.