Luis Ernesto Delgado recently raised an important paradox in an AgroLatam column: A summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping can look underwhelming when measured against the enormous strategic differences separating Washington and Beijing, yet still matter enormously to a farmer in Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska or Kansas.

I agree.

For American agriculture, a reference to soybeans, sorghum, beef or market access is not a minor diplomatic detail. It can mean additional demand, movement in commodity prices, different storage decisions and, ultimately, money in a producer's pocket.

But I would take Delgado's argument one step further.

U.S. agriculture cannot build its China strategy around waiting for the next summit.

A Purchase Is Not a Strategy

The numbers help explain the problem.

The United States exported roughly $171 billion in agricultural products in 2025. China, once one of the essential destinations for U.S. agriculture, fell to sixth place among export markets, purchasing about $8.4 billion - roughly 66% less than the previous year.

The White House later announced Chinese commitments to purchase at least $17 billion annually in U.S. agricultural products in 2026, 2027 and 2028, in addition to specific commitments involving soybeans.

Those purchases matter to farmers.

A lot.

But recovering sales is not the same thing as restoring the commercial relationship American agriculture had with China a decade ago.

China learned from the trade wars, too.

Beijing has spent years diversifying suppliers, strengthening its agricultural relationship with Brazil and reducing its exposure to the United States in strategically important commodities. That transformation does not disappear after a presidential meeting.

Washington therefore needs to distinguish between two very different objectives: selling more U.S. agricultural products to China and becoming dependent on China again.

The first is necessary.

The second would create another strategic vulnerability.

The Market America Lost Was Not Standing Still

Soybeans illustrate the shift better than almost any other commodity.

For years, the equation looked remarkably straightforward: China needed enormous quantities of protein to support its livestock sector, and American farmers had soybeans to sell.

But global markets do not freeze while Washington and Beijing negotiate.

Brazil expanded production, infrastructure and export capacity. China deepened that commercial relationship. Every new episode of U.S.-China tension gives Beijing another incentive to strengthen alternative supply chains.

That means recovering market share will be considerably harder than announcing new purchases.

The American soybean farmer is not competing only against Chinese tariffs or trade policy. He is competing against Brazilian production, logistics costs, currency movements and a global supply chain that continued evolving while the United States and China argued.

America's Best Trade Hedge Is More Buyers

Delgado makes another point that deserves emphasis: A farm cannot plan like a diplomatic summit.

That observation goes to the heart of the problem.

Farmers make decisions with multi-year consequences. They buy equipment, rent or purchase land, finance fertilizer, invest in grain storage, adopt precision agriculture technologies and make crop insurance decisions long before anyone knows what the next round of negotiations with Beijing will produce.

Yet U.S.-China agricultural trade has increasingly operated on a much shorter cycle: threat, tariff, negotiation, truce, commitment - and then another negotiation.

It is difficult to build predictability around that model.

Crop insurance can protect producers from certain risks. A farm bill can strengthen the domestic safety net. USDA programs can help develop overseas markets.

But no federal program can permanently substitute for lost demand.

The best commercial insurance policy for American agriculture is a larger and more diversified customer base.

Mexico Matters. Japan Matters. Vietnam Matters.

This is where the China debate needs to evolve.

In 2025, the five largest markets for U.S. agricultural exports were Mexico, Canada, the European Union, Japan and South Korea. China ranked sixth.

That fact should not be viewed only as evidence of how much ground the United States lost in China. It also points toward where future opportunities may exist.

Mexico purchased more than $30 billion in U.S. agricultural products in 2025. Canada remained near $29 billion. The European Union accounted for roughly $14.5 billion, while Japan and South Korea remained major destinations.

Then there are markets such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and other emerging Asian economies where rising incomes, urbanization and changing diets could create additional opportunities for U.S. agriculture.

China remains far too large to ignore.

But it should become one of several major markets - not the market whose absence forces Washington into emergency negotiations.

Competitiveness Starts at Home

Diversification is not simply a matter of sending trade delegations abroad to find new buyers.

The United States still has to win their business.

That requires efficient ports, reliable rail and river transportation, manageable input costs, genetic innovation, productivity gains and continued investment in precision agriculture.

It also means identifying where sustainable agriculture can become a commercial advantage as certain markets place greater emphasis on traceability, carbon intensity and other production attributes.

Most importantly, Washington needs to recognize a basic reality: Market access is agricultural policy.

Co-ops can improve scale and marketing. USDA can support export promotion. The farm bill can provide risk-management tools.

But when competitors sign agreements, improve infrastructure and capture market share while the United States relies on periodic negotiations, American farmers eventually absorb part of that disadvantage.

Trump and Xi Should Talk. Farmers Should Not Have to Depend on It.

This is where I return to Delgado's original argument.

Keeping channels open between Washington and Beijing has value.

The United States should sell China every commercially viable bushel of soybeans, every ton of sorghum and every pound of beef, pork and poultry that Chinese buyers are prepared to purchase under acceptable terms.

The more important question is what America does next.

If the strategy ends when China signs another purchase commitment, Washington has secured a sale.

If those sales provide time to expand other markets, improve competitiveness and reduce concentration risk, then the United States has built something far more valuable.

A strategy.

American agriculture does not need to choose between China and the rest of the world.

It needs China and the rest of the world.

The next Trump-Xi summit may produce additional agricultural purchases. If it does, farmers should hope those commitments turn into actual contracts, loaded vessels and stronger demand.

But five or ten years from now, the success of U.S. agricultural trade policy should not be measured by how many times an American president had to sit across from Xi Jinping to recover a market.

It should be measured by something much simpler:

When China buys, American farmers benefit.

And when China does not buy, American farmers still have somewhere else to sell.